ABSTRACT In the era of cloud computing, the cloud server always plays a significant role to carry the heavy tasks of computation. As for storage services, it provides an efficient manner for accessing data. For data privacy, encryption is usually referred to as a simple approach, but in fact cloud services cannot work with the traditional encryption. Therefore, outsourced computing over encrypted data receives attention of preserving privacy in the cloud setting. The notion, privacy-preserving outsourced similarity test (PPOS) over encrypted data, is introduced to capture the following scenario. The cloud stores encrypted data with the encrypted feature vector and then picks up the target data by testing similarity between those vectors and the search query. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a PPOS scheme based on additive homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In this paper, we aim for presenting the formal security model and new scheme of PPOS. We use as few primitives as possible to minimize cryptographic building blocks. Our solution avoids using homomorphic encryption and constructs the PPOS scheme simply from garbled circuits and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage always plays a significant role in cloud computing and receives lots of attention in the last few years. For outsourcing computation overhead, the cloud can carry complicated computation (i.e., learning algorithm for bigdata). A user may only need to hold a mobile device (with weak computation power) but can enjoy the computing services from the cloud. In particular, plenty of storage services have been developed such as Dropbox, iCloud, and SkyDrive. These provide extra space for mobile devices, and also to keep synchronization and consistency among multiple devices. In addition, they offer efficiently storing and accessing data.
The convenience, offered by the cloud storage, depends on a full trust where users must fully trust the cloud server. Without that trust, a challenge of privacy and confidentiality is how to protect of sensitive or private data and simultaneously enjoy efficient search via the cloud [1] . Intuitively, secure encryption is a straightforward way to providing data confidentiality. If a user would like to obtain a part of encrypted data he uploading to the server, without revealing key to the server, he has to retrieves all of them from the server and picks the target and needed ones. However, the encrypted data are unreadable as random strings, which implies that server cannot directly search with his requirement. The abovementioned solution is trivial and not efficient, since the server is only a storage server and does not perform any efficiency aid, and the user needs one but must retrieve all from the server. Keyword-searchable encryption [2] - [8] (SE,for short) is presented to conceptually provide a method for efficiently search over encrypted data. In SE with public key setting, the sender uses the receiver's public key to encrypt data and their corresponding keywords, and then sends them to the cloud server. Later, the receiver can use the private key to generate trapdoors of search keywords, and then sends them to the cloud. Finally, the cloud can test the keyword ciphertext and trapdoor, and returns the corresponding encrypted data if the ciphertext of the keyword and trapdoor matches. However, SE only supports text search based on keyword matching (directly comparing keyword ciphertext by judging whether they are matched) and is not suitable for complex content search (computing the distance between feature vectors to obtain similarity). Privacy-preserving outsource computing with similarity test (PPOS), the simple application of cloud storage, is introduced to meet a specific scenario that is similar to that of SE. As shown in Fig 1, the user A (denoted by A) uploads the encrypted original data to the sharing cloud, and the encrypted feature to the searching cloud. Particularly, such the feature is extracted from the original data. The user B (by B) searches data by producing the search request from search feature and then sends the access token (similar to trapdoor) to the searching cloud. Then, the search cloud will return the result of similarity test between the search feature and the original feature; i.e., L2-norm). B takes the result to retrieve data from the sharing cloud. Intuitively, for functionality, PPOS is similar to SE, but for framework setting, PPOS would like to achieve different goals from SE.
Zhang et al. [9] , [10] proposed a PPOS scheme based on ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) [11] - [15] , additive homomorphic encryption (HE) [16] - [21] and garbled circuits [22] - [29] . We briefly summarized their main idea in their protocol.
-A generates a public key, a secret key of HE, and a garbling key. Then he runs key generation for CP-ABE, sets the access structure, and gives B an access key (note that B can perform decryption of CP-ABE for one ciphertext if his access key matches the attributes of it). -A uploads the ciphertext of key of HE and the garbling key encrypted by CP-ABE. -A generates the XOR(x A (k), ·) garbled circuits for each dimension k of x A , and the output is the HE ciphertext consisting of bit. -B fetches the ciphertext of CP-ABE, decrypts it to get the garbling key, and generates the garbled input from the garbling key and his search request x B . -Finally, the searching cloud server receives the garbled input uploaded by B and uses it to get HE.E(XOR(x A (k), x B (k))) in each dimension. Then computes the summation of all dimensions to get
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
Our motivation and observation are that their scheme works with two individual computations (including XOR operations in garbled circuit and summation in HE). Intuitively, we would like to get rid of the use of HE, since garbled circuits can also be used to take summation computation. We propose a new scheme based on CP-ABE and garbled circuit. In the following, we highlight our techniques in our scheme.
-A generates a specific circuit that hardcodes A's input (feature value) and computes summation of XOR(x A , ·) for each feature dimension; the input of the specific circuit is exactly the search request of B. This suffices to combine the two individual computations of Zhang et al. [9] , [10] 's scheme. -A uploads the garbled circuit of the specific circuit and the CP-ABE ciphertext of the garbling key to the searching cloud. -B can decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext to obtain the garbling key, and then uses it to generate the garbled input for his search request and send the garbled input to the searching cloud. -Finally, the searching cloud runs evaluation of the garbled circuit and input, and then returns the ''plain'' result of the evaluation to B. Except for the proposed scheme, we pay more attention on the security. We firstly introduce the definition of simulation security of PPOS with semi-honest adversaries. For proving our scheme, there is a challenge where the security of garbled circuits cannot be directly applied. Finally, we decouple the garbled circuit into many components of chosen double encryption, and then complete the security proof by using the security of chosen double encryption.
B. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes some preliminaries including garbled circuits and CP-ABE. Section III presents the framework of PPOS and a new security model. In Section IV, we introduce the proposed scheme, and give the security proof and some discussions. Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
At the beginning, we must define the negligible function [30] - [32] . For every polynomial time function p(n) and all sufficiently large n, there is
.
We use such the negligible function in this paper to state the hardness of the primitives.
A. GARBLED CIRCUITS
Garbled circuits were first proposed by Yao [22] for two-party computation. A garbled circuit scheme includes a pair of algorithms (GarbleC and Eval), where GarbleC is the circuit procedure and Eval is the corresponding result evaluation procedure. Each input and output wire w of the circuit is associated with two labels, lkey w 0 and lkey w 1 , corresponding to the bit value b ∈ 0, 1. Finally, the garbled circuit performs blind evaluation by taking garbling input. For security, it does not reveal anything except for the evaluation result of the output. A garbling scheme is usually composed of two algorithms as follows.
• GarbleC(1 λ , C, i, b, lkey
): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ, a circuit C, and a set of labels for all output wires i ∈ out(C) and b ∈0,1. We denote the sets of input and output wires by • Eval( C, lkey in,1 , lkey in,2 , . . . ): Given a garbled circuit C and a sequence of input labels lkey in,j , this algorithm outputs a sequence of output labels lkey out,i . Intuitively, if the input labels correspond to some input x then the output labels should correspond to y = C(x). Without loss of generality, we describe the circuit garbling scheme as the following abstraction with four algorithms.
• KeyGen(1 λ ): generates the garbling key GKey.
• GarbleC(GKey, C(·)): generates the garbled circuit C • GarbleInp(GKey, x): generates the garbled input x • Eval( C, x): evaluates the result C(x) We omit to show the security of garbled circuits, because it is not used in the paper.
B. CP-ABE
Ciphertext policy attribute based encryption [11] - [15] (CP-ABE for short) is a popular and secure access control protocol based on ciphertext policy. In CP-ABE, a key corresponds to a set of attributes A. Formally, the key of CP-ABE is composed of the boolean values of the attributes and the boolean operators (AND/OR). Therefore, when data are encrypted by access control policy, the user can execute decryption successfully and correctly only if the user's identity satisfies the attribute of A. Generally speaking, a CP-ABE scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup(1 λ ): Given only the security parameter 1 λ , it outputs the public parameters P and a master key K
• Enc(P, M , S): It takes the public parameters P, a message M , and an access structure S as inputs. We assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains S. Subsequently, the algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT .
• KeyGen(K , A): It takes the master key K and a set of attributes A as input and then generates a private key K S .
• Dec(P, CT , K S ): It takes the public parameters P, the ciphertext CT , and the private key K S as input. We define that the above as limited chosen-plaintext attacks (LCPA). It is sort of different from chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), because of the requirement that some bits of (m 0 , m 1 ) are identical. 1 Formally, CP-ABE is secure if, for every polynomial time adversaries and all sufficiently large n,
where negl(n) is a negligible function.
C. CHOSEN DOUBLE ENCRYPTION
We need a primitive, double encryption [33] - [37] , to construct garbled circuits. These objects formalize a two-key lockbox where we must have both keys to open the box. It suffices to be used as building blocks to construct the garbled circuit scheme. A double encryption scheme is associated to an encryption scheme . Double encryption randomly choose k 0 , k 1 and encrypt the plaintext twice by encryption scheme . Such that, the ciphertext can be decrypted if and only if the user have both k 0 and k 1 .
Formally, if we use the following syntax to describe an encryption :
• Gen(1 λ ): It randomly generate a key k.
• Enc(k, m): Given the key k and the plaintext m, it encrypts m and outputs a ciphertext c = Enc k (m).
• Dec(k, c): It takes the key k and the ciphertext c as inputs, it outputs m = Dec k (c) as the decryption results. By using the typical encryption, a double encryption scheme based on consists of the following algorithms:
• DGen(1 λ ): It generates the key (k 0 , k 1 ) by running Gen(1 λ ) twice.
• DEnc(k 0 , k 1 , m): Given the key (k 0 , k 1 ) and the plaintext m, it encrypts m twice and outputs a ciphertext as c = Enc k 0 (Enc k 1 (m)). Note that for simplicity,
• DDec(k 0 , k 1 , c): It takes the key (k 0 , k 1 ) and the ciphertext c as inputs, it outputs m = Dec k 0 (Dec k 1 (c)). For convenience, we rewrite some notions for the double encryption.
•
• EncO(k 0 , ·, ·) is the oracle taking key k , message m and outputs Enc(k 0 , k , m ). EncO(·, k 1 , ·) is defined similarly. The double encryption is a clear notion to construct garble circuits. Let Garble be the garbled circuit scheme by using double encryption as building blocks. Taken a gate (c; a, b), Garble produces four results of double encryption as the garbled gate (further, gates can form a circuit). Figure 2 shows the garbled XOR gate. For each wire of inputs wires a, b and output wire c, it randomly chooses two keys (k a0 , k a1 ), (k b0 , k b1 ) and (k c0 , k c1 ) as the garbling inputs corresponding to the bit value {0, 1}. Then given the garbling inputs of a and b, it can compute the garbling outputs by successfully decrypting the corresponding encryption in the table. Then map the garbling outputs to the result value of c. Hence, garbled circuits is a series of chosen double encryption tables as shown in Fig. 2 .
Security-Chosen Double Encryption: We say a double encryption scheme is chosen double encryption [36] , [38] if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A,
where negl(n) is a negligible function. Expt denc A (n, b) is defined as the following: 1) The adversary A takes 1 n as input and outputs keys (k 0 , k 1 ) of length n, and two triples of messages (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) and (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ), all of which are of the same length. 2) Two keys k 0 , k 1 ← KeyGen(1 n ) are chosen by the key generation algorithm of the encryption scheme.
III. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY OF PPOS
PPOS is an outsourced computing framework of data sharing and searching based on similarity test. It focuses on two main objectives:
1) Data sharing with selective access delegation.
2) Data searching with efficiency and security.
A. FRAMEWORK
To achieve these goals, the framework is composed of three phases: key generation, data uploading, and data searching. 
1) KEY GENERATION
This framework allows a user to share his data selectively with someone who holds the delegation. When A registers, the system generates his searching key for data uploading and searching. Subsequently, to achieve selective access delegation to data, A can protect the key through access control, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . In other words, A will encrypt the key with access control rules and upload the encrypted key to the cloud, so only the designated user can search data through access the search key from the cloud.
2) DATA UPLOADING
A performs preprocessing for the original data before uploading. The features of data are extracted by A, and they may VOLUME 6, 2018
be related to timestamps, document titles, file formats, media content and so on. These features are transformed into a binary feature vector, so-called feature vector.
A uses symmetric encryption to encrypt the original data, and encrypts the symmetric key by access control, then uploads them together to the sharing cloud. Simultaneously, the encrypted binary feature vector is uploaded to the searching cloud, as shown in Fig. 4 . 
3) DATA SEARCHING
At first, B has to generate the feature vector to describe the searching request before searching A's data. This feature vector for search is referred to as the searching vector. If B satisfies the rules for access control set by A, it enables B obtains the searching key of A from the cloud. Thus, B generates an encrypted searching vector with the searching key.
After that, B sends the encrypted searching vector to the cloud server. The cloud computes similarity test as the distance between the searching vector of B and all the feature vector of A without any further interactions with A. The cloud then returns the corresponding encrypted data to B, and then those can can be decrypted by B. Conclusively, B can request the specified data, as illustrated in Fig. 5 . The cloud manages the entire procedure without any plain knowledge about the data or searching content except for the similarity test result. Note that the cloud knows the test result to accurately return the corresponding data.
B. NEW SECURITY MODEL
We now define a security model for PPOS in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Assume that A and B are honest parties, not corrupted by the adversary A. This setting guarantees the correctness. Based on the standard formulation of simulation paradigm, the goal of security is to formalize a simulator who generates the view of the cloud server in the execution. Intuitively, the view of cloud in the protocol execution can be simulated, which means that it learns nothing from the execution except for the simulator's input and output.
1) SEMI-HONEST ADVERSARIES IN PPOS
Generally speaking, there are three parties involved in PPOS: data owner A, data searcher B and the cloud server. Obviously, since PPOS is aimed for the untrusted third party data centers, we consider that the adversary corrupts only the cloud.
The security definition that we state here is against a semihonest adversary A. Therefore, A eavesdrops the cloud and tries to learn more than the view that it observes, but honestly and exactly follows the protocol [31] , [32] . We remark that deviating from the protocol and returning incorrect results will influence the user experience for the cloud server. Therefore, we assume that the cloud server will follow the protocol honestly.
2) PRIVACY BY SIMULATION
As above, we need to care a protocol how to be simulated [31] , [32] , [39] . We say a protocol is secure, then there exists a probability polynomial-time simulator S, such that the string 2 produced by S has three requirements: (a) Correctness: S can finally result in the correct output that is identical to that of the protocol; (b) Privacy: S does not contain any privacy information; (c) Distinguishability: it implies that for every probability polynomial-time observer that receives the input/output distribution of an honest party and the adversary, the probability of outputting 1 upon receiving the string generated by the S is negligibly close to that upon receiving VIEW cloud , where VIEW cloud denote the view of the cloud server. Formally, we state the above as
where D is the observer, f cloud is ideal functionality of the protocol, inp A , inp B are the inputs of A, B, and negl(n) is a negligible function.
The protocol is secure if such the probability polynomialtime simulator exists [32] . This can be interpreted as that it is computationally hard, for all probability polynomial-time adversaries, to learn more than the information held by the simulator. Figure 6 summarizes the definition. 
IV. A NEW PPOS SCHEME WITH PROVABLE SECURITY
In this section, we will introduce our scheme, and then prove its security. Moreover, we provide some discussions and implementations.
A. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We propose a new PPOS scheme to tackle data searching under ciphertext. Our scheme is based on garbled circuit to compute the similarity between the searching vector and the feature vector. Hence, it describes how to encrypt/decrypt the vectors and obtain the results of similarity as the following processes.
1) INITIALIZATION
The system runs ABE.Setup(1 λ ) to produces (P, K ). Given a set of attributes A, it runs ABE.KeyGen(K , A) to produce a private key K S . In this system, B will hold the private key K S for A, and P is public.
2) DATA UPLOADING BY A 1) Use KeyGen GC (1 λ ) to obtain the GKey. As long as A registers, A is required to generate A's searching key. 2) Compute ct = ABE.Enc P (data) as encryption of data and upload ct to the storing cloud. 3) Get ct = ABE.Enc P (GKey) and upload it to the searching cloud. For example, if A wants to delegate access to someone by access control, he uses CP-ABE to encrypt the key. After that, ABE.Enc P (GKey) is uploaded to the cloud. 2) Decrypt m = ABE.Dec K S (ct) to get the garbling key. If B matches the access structure made by A, B can decrypt ABE.Enc P (Gkey) successfully. 3) Set inp B as x. Use GarbleInp(Gkey, x) to get x and upload it to the cloud.
4) Use GarbleC(GKey, C(·)) to get C and upload, where C(·) is the circuit to implement a function
f l 1 (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = k i=1 |inp A,i − x i |
4) DATA SEARCHING BY CLOUD
The search cloud uses Eval( C, x) to get C(x). After receiving x, the cloud evaluates with C to get the test result, a.k.a. the distance between vectors, and then returns it to B. (If we care output privacy, the cloud can return the ciphertext version instead.) Finally, according to the test result, the storing cloud can return the corresponding ct to B to complete searching.
5) CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY
The correctness of the final result can be verified by the following:
The security of this scheme is based on CPA-security of CP-ABE and chosen double encryption. We postpone the proof sketch of the security to the next subsection.
B. SECURITY PROOF OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Theorem 1: Assuming that CP-ABE is CPA-security and chosen double encryption is also secure to construct garbled circuits, our protocol is a PPOS scheme in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
To prove the theorem of security, we now provide the formal description of the simulator, and then briefly show the sketch of the security proof. The missing details of the proof are located in Appendix. VOLUME 6, 2018 In order to prove the security of the protocol, we consider that the cloud server is exactly honest and curious, and build a simulator S for the cloud. With no significant information except for the security parameter and final output, this simulator can generate the view of the incoming message received by the cloud. In the protocol, the cloud receives the ciphertext of the key ABE.E(GKey), garbled circuits C, and garble inputs x.
Formally, S is given to 1 n and work as follows: 1) Gkey ← keyGen(1 n ): S generates Gkey of the form of a set of labels ,where lkey k b is the label for for wire k ∈ C and b ∈ 0, 1. 2) ABE.Enc(Gkey ): S set a Gkey totally different from Gkey, and using CP-ABE to encrypt the Gkey . A , ·) ,and garble the circuits C(·). 4) x ← GarbledInp(Gkey, x) and x ← GarbledInp (Gkey, x): S garbles inputs twice with different Gkey and Gkey 5) C ← VGC(1 n , C, x): invoked on the parameters 1 n , the actual garbled circuits C and the actual garble inputs x, the algorithm VGC works to produce a virtual garbled circuits as follows:
3) C ← GarbleC(Gkey, C(·)): S set C(·) = ADD(XOR(input
• For each gate (w; u, v), in place of the corresponding table in the real circuit, VGC publishes the encryption of L w0 under all pairs of labels of u and v, making up the following table in random order
• VGC outputs the replaced garbled circuits C finally. 6) S outputs (n, ABE.E(Gkey ), C , x ).
2) PROOF SKETCH
The protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries if the outputs of S is computational indistinguishable to VIEW cloud , formally, λ, ABE.Enc(Gkey ), C , x ≈ λ, ABE.Enc(Gkey), C, x Therefore, we say that the protocol is secure by proving that the output of S and view are indistinguishable. In order to that, we define the following hybrids {H 1 , . . . , H |C| , H |C|+1 }, and then we prove the relationship between
3) DETAILS OF HYBRIDS
First of all, for i = 1, . . . , |c|, we define hybrid H i working as follows:
1) S working as the above, generate Gkey, ABE.Enc (Gkey), C, x. 2) HC i ← (1 n , C, x, i) : Produce a hybrid garbled circuits HC i , which is a remix of C and C . In hybrid HC i , the tables of all gate upto gate i (including i) are published according to VGC, and the table for the remaining gates are published according to the actual C. (That is, all the tables for gates upto gate i, the four encryption is of the same label, and for the rest, the encryptions obey the calculation the gate. It is straightforward that HC 0 = C and HC |C| = C .) 3) S outputs (n, ABE.E(Gkey), HC i , x). Next, we define H |C|+1 working as follows: 1) S generates Gkey and C as the above. 2) ABE.Enc(Gkey h ): S set Gkey h , some bits of which are identical to those of Gkey in the path of GarbledInp on x, and the other bits are identical to Gkey . So that GarbledInp(Gkey, x) = GarbledInp(Gkey h , x). Then using CP-ABE to encrypt the Gkey h . 3) x ← GarbledInp(Gkey h , x): S generates garbled inputs with the Gkey h , and it equals GarbledInp (Gkey, x). 4) C ← VCG(1 n , C, x): run the algorithm VCG to produce the simulated garbled circuits. 5) S outputs (n, ABE.E(Gkey h ), C , x). Then, we define H |C|+2 working as follows: 1) S generate Gkey, ABE.Enc(Gkey h ), C as H |C|+1 .
2) x ← GarbledInp (Gkey , x): S inverse the path of GarbledInp to get a different garbled inputs x 3) S outputs (n, ABE.E(Gkey h ), C , x ). Finally, it is easy to say that H 0 = VIEW cloud and H |C|+3 = OUT S , where OUT S means the output of S. (The complete version of hybrids are shown in Appendix A.)
Lemma 1: For i ∈ (0, |C|], the outputs of H i−1 is computational indistinguishable to that of H i , if chosen double encryption is secure to construct garbled circuits.
The details of the security proof of Lemma 1 is shown in Appendix -A.
Lemma 2: The outputs of H |C| is computational indistinguishable to that of H |C|+1 , if CP-ABE is Limited-CPAsecurity.
The difference between H |C| and H |C|+1 focus on (Gkey, x) and (Gkey h , x) . We also show the details of the security proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix -B.
Lemma 3: The outputs of H |C|+1 is (distributionally) identical to that of H |C|+2 . H |C|+2 is different to H |C|+1 because of the different path of GarbledInp. In other word, even x and x is different, they are both generated from Gkey h . So that their probability distribution is identical. Hence, without assumption, it is easy to say that H |C|+1 is computational indistinguishable to that of H |C|+2 By the standard hybrid argument as above-mentioned, it suffices to show that the view of S is (computationally) indistinguishable from VIEW cloud .
C. MORE DISCUSSIONS 1) SUMMARIZING OUR TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS
We briefly highlight our techniques and compare them with those of the previous work [9] . Intuitively, to achieve the encrypted data searching, we usually rely on homomorphic encryption to compute similarity. However, as less as possible primitives is always our expectation in cryptography, and HE usually induces much more computational overhead. Thus, our scheme is only constructed from access control and garbled circuits. This not only protects the data in the cloud from accessed by unauthorized user, but also allows the data be searched by authorized user without disclosure. We achieve similarity test over encrypted data by computing the distance between the searching vector and the feature vectors of all the data, and then picking up the one with the minimum distance. Indeed, it implies maximum similarity, and along with similarity the corresponding data will be returned. The main technique is how to compute over the ciphertext, and garbled circuits are exactly the building block.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the feature vectors and the searching vector both have the same number of dimensions. There are more than one bit in each dimension. Accordingly, we use XOR to calculate the subtraction of two vectors on each dimension, since the vectors both are binary vectors. Finally, to sum up all the subtractions, we are able to obtain the final distance about all the dimensions. Note that all the above processes are implemented by evaluating garbled circuits to preserve input privacy.
Eventually, the proposed scheme remains a challenge that the security of garbled circuits cannot be directly applied to prove its security. We choose to decouple the garbled circuit into many tiny components of chosen double encryption. Then, complete the security proof by using the security of chosen double encryption.
2) SOME ISSUES FOR SECURITY AND ASSUMPTION
We rely on the security of CP-ABE as limited-CPA security to complete the security proof. If a CP-ABE scheme is CPA security, it is also limited-CPA security. However, we already know some candidates of CP-ABE offering CPA security, and thus we should use those CPA-secure CP-ABE [11] - [15] to construct our scheme. It also leads a future work to re-design our scheme and complete the proof by using CPA security of CP-ABE.
In addition, the garbled circuit scheme is one-time, which means once B consumes one garbling key to produce a search request, this key cannot be used to another request at next time. It is because of the one-time security of the garbled circuit scheme. To overcome this, A can prepare many garbling keys and garbled circuits, or an alternative solution is that the cloud requires A to replenish afterwards as long as garbled keys and circuits are all consumed. However, we also have the reusable garbled circuit scheme [25] which directly meets our above goal but is based on much strong cryptographic primitives.
Finally, there are some minor issues we may need to tackle, but they are not hard to be overcome.
1. If we would like to preserve the ''output privacy'' against the searching cloud, we can trivially set the final result is a ciphertext. 2. In addition, size of the entire garbling key may be not short, but we can deliver a short pseudorandom generator seed which is used to generate the long garbling key via pseudorandom generator. 3. For lifting the security from semi-honest to malicious, the standard technique is to use GMW compiler [40] .
3) IMPLEMENTATION
Our system is implemented by Python 3.5.1 under Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200 CPU 2.30GHz, 8.00GB RAM and Win10 64-bit operating system. The experiments for the proposed scheme is measured by taking 10000 random data as testing inputs. The average performance of garbled circuit generation and evaluation will be shown in Fig. 8 (Fig. 9 , resp.) for input size from 10 3 to 10 4 bits (from 10 4 to 10 5 , resp.). From Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , we can see that the time of garble circuit generation is very short, and the computational overhead is very small. The generation time when the input size is between 10 3 to 10 4 bits is less than 1 second, while that when 10 5 to 10 6 bits is less than 10 seconds. Compared with the garbled circuit generation, the computational overhead of evaluation performs not so well; it increases linearly with the data length obviously. However, the evaluation of the garble circuit is outsourced computed by cloud servers, so the VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 9. Average performance of garbled circuit generation and evaluation for input size from 10000 to 100000 bits.
efficiency of the evaluation can be improved by the computing power of cloud servers and distributed computing system.
V. CONCLUSION
Cloud storage is a significant application in cloud computing. It provides extra space for mobile devices and keeps synchronization and consistency among multiple devices. However, privacy is always a security issue in this field. In this paper, we formalize the notion of PPOS (privacy-preserving outsource similarity test), particularly focus on security definition. We propose a new PPOS scheme based on CP-ABE and garbled circuits. This scheme achieves encrypted data search by similarity test between feature vectors and searching vectors of data. To complete the security proof, we rely on the security of chosen double encryption and limited-CPA security of CP-ABE. by reduction, but is contradicted to the assumption of chosen double encryption. Hence, we say that H i is computationally indistinguishable to H i−1 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|, and the proof is done.
APPENDIX MISSING DETAILS OF THE SECURITY PROOF

B. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We now need to show n, ABE.E(Gkey h ), C , x ≈ n, ABE.E(Gkey), C , x .
